International Crisis Group on Lebanon

A couple of days ago, fellow blogger Hassan sent me an Interational Crisis Group (ICG) report on Lebanon. Blogger Lazarus at Letters Appart also read the report, and has posted an entry with some quotations from it.

I will copy and paste some quotations of certain Lebanese politicians and analysts from the report that I found to be very revealing.

Thank you Hassan for bringing this to my attention. I also tip my hat to ICG for conducting what appears to be a very thorough study.

The U.S., France and UK are helping overhaul the security sector:[1] France is compiling an inventory and audit of security forces, and a blueprint for reconstruction of the security sector of security services; and the UK is helping to streamline multiple and overlapping security agencies under the defence ministry. The U.S. reportedly was asked by the government to assist in securing the mountainous frontier with Syria with physical barriers, lethal platforms and sensors.[2]

[1] Crisis Group interviews with Western diplomats, Beirut, October 2005.

[2] Geostrategy-Direct, www.geostrategy-direct.com, October 11 2005.

Rafiq Hariri was a Sunni leader, not just in Beirut, but throughout Lebanon and the Arab world. This is our revenge: to put Bashar al-Asad on trial. Maybe we can topple the regime. The Sunnis form the majority in Syria….We cannot continue with the Shiite Alawi regime.[1]

[1] Crisis Group interview with Walid Kebbe, op. cit,

The Americans don’t understand the complexity of relations between Sunni and Shiites. The Christians are the only ones who can live together with Sunni, Shiite and Druze. There are no mixed villages with Sunnis and Shiites. Only the Christians live with all. Therefore, if you really want a solution for Lebanon, you have to discuss with the Christians to gain the confidence of all parties. That’s the lesson of centuries of experience in Lebanon and Arab history. Sunni and Shiite cannot live together. Christians are needed.[1]

[1] Crisis Group interview of Michel Aoun, Beirut, 27 October 2005.

Aoun opposes Lebanon’s rule by the House of Hariri. Hizbollah opposes placing Lebanon under Hariri’s international alliance. As a result, there’s a new alliance between Aoun and the president, Hizbollah and Syria against Jumblatt, Hariri and Western powers.[1]

[1] Crisis Group interview with Ibrahim Amin, al-Safir newspaper, Beirut, 5 October 2005.

Sectarian tensions are greater than at any time since 1990. Lebanon has always been a place where Shiites and Sunni coexist. But outside involvement – of Iran with Shiites and of Arab states with Sunnis – is making matters worse.[1]

[1] Crisis Group interview with Hani Abdullah, political adviser to Ayatollah Hassanein Fadlallah, Beirut, 26 October 2005. Ali Fayyadh, an analyst close to Hizbollah, echoed this view: “The Middle East is unstable, a storm is raging, and Lebanon is at the heart of the storm. The last time Sunni-Shiite tensions were as high was in 1986, during the Camp Wars [when Amal attacked refugee camps controlled by Palestinian Sunnis]”. Crisis Group interview, op. cit. Islamist groups also may be finding fertile soil. Salafi preachers have established schools in Lebanon in recent months, some of which propagate militant anti-Shiism. Salafis interviewed by Crisis Group declined to say whether Ayatollah Ali Sistani of Najaf and Iran’s former leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini were Muslims; Shiite preachers accused Salafi clerics of exacerbating sectarian tensions through incendiary sermons. Crisis Group interviews, Beirut, October 2005.

The resistance is part of the equilibrium for Lebanon’s stability. For Larsen to say it is illegitimate is explosive. If there is international pressure to erode the resistance, Lebanon will pay the price of chaos. If the army tries to intervene, it will be divided because a majority of the army is Shiite, and Hizbollah will be forced to defend itself. If the U.S. attacks Syria, this would be a strategic threat to Lebanon, and we would be sandwiched between Israel’s and America’s armies, and we would have a duty to deploy the resistance.[1]

[1] Crisis Group interview with Ali Fayyadh, op. cit.

The message is, if you seriously consider disarming Hizbollah, you will have a potentially explosive situation, as the focus will return to the issue of representation. Shiites may demand a majoritarian system and Hizbollah would be at the forefront of this demand. So in a way, and in terms of domestic politics, Hizbollah without arms would be much more dangerous than Hizbollah with arms.[1]

[1] Crisis Group interview with Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, Beirut, 16 June 2005.

God granted the individual…reason. A man of religious learning can advise Muslims, for example, ‘not to vote for corrupt candidates’. But it is still up to the individual himself to decide who is corrupt and who isn’t. Hizbollah violated this principle…. Shiites were made to feel endangered, so they felt compelled to vote. And that’s dangerous, as now the Shiites think the resistance’s weapons are theirs.[1]

[1] Crisis Group interview with a Fadlallah political advisor, Beirut, 28 June 2005. He added that relations between Nasrallah and Fadlallah are strained, and they have met only once since Hariri’s assassination. On this issue in particular, Fadlallah appeared to be seeking to curb efforts by Hizbollah to assert a hegemonic position among Shiites.

I’m side-by-side with Hizbollah. It’s a big asset against any Israeli aggression. I oppose 1559 because it was designed to serve Israel. As long as Israel won’t abide by international law, the Lebanese Army and Hizbollah should both survive in the South.[1]

[1] Crisis Group interview with Walid [flip-flop] Jumblatt, 11 October 2005.

Their attitude [on joining the government] is a dramatic change from the past. But they are going to instrumentalise the state to protect the resistance. They know how difficult it will be for the U.S. and Israel to mess with them. The party is not becoming “Lebanonised”; rather it is “Hizbollah-ising” the state.[1]

[1] Crisis group interview with Saad Ghorayeb, Beirut, 23 June 2005. See also “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (for 21 January 2005 to 20 July 2005)”, 21 July 2005.